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ABSTRACT
It is often alleged that PTAs involving the EC and the US include a significant number of
obligations in areas not currently covered by the WTO Agreement, such as investment
protection, competition policy, labour standards and environmental protection. The
primary purpose of this study is highlight the extent to which these claims are true. The
study divides the contents of all PTAs involving the EC and the US currently notified to
the WTO, into 14 “WTO+” and 38 ‘WTO-X” areas, where WTO+ provisions come
under the current mandate of the WTO, and WTO-X provisions deal with issues lying
outside the current WTO mandate. As a second step, the legal enforceability of each
obligation is evaluated, judged on the extent to which the text specifies clear obligations.
Among the findings are:
(i) EC agreements contain almost four times as many instances of WTO-X provisions as
do US agreements;
(ii) but EC agreements evidence a very significant amount of ‘legal inflation’ (i.e., nonlegally enforceable provisions) in the WTO-X category, and US agreements actually
contain a more of enforceable WTO-X provisions than do the EC agreements; and
(iii) US agreements tend to emphasize regulatory areas more compared to EC
agreements.

Keywords: Preferential trading agreements, enforceable, legal inflation
JEL Codes: F13, F15, K33
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1. Introduction

There is growing concern about preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and the role they
should play within the multilateral trading system. This concern stems both from their
increasing number and their ever-broader scope.

During the period 1948-1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
received 124 notifications of PTAs, of which about 50 were active at the creation of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. Since then, more than 250 new arrangements
have been notified to the WTO, and the number of arrangements active in 2008 was
about 200. A large part of this expansion involves agreements where the European
Community (EC)1 or the United States (US) is a partner. As a result, the EC and the US
have become the two main ‘hubs’ in the pattern of PTAs, with the ‘spokes’ represented
by agreements with the various partner countries.

Modern PTAs exhibit features that earlier PTAs did not possess. In particular, PTAs
formed before 1995 concerned only trade in goods and took the form of (mostly) freetrade areas (FTAs) or (more rarely) customs unions (CUs), involving mainly tariff
liberalisation. Since the creation of the WTO and the extension of multilateral trade
agreements to trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights,
new PTAs also tend to cover these two subjects, which revolve chiefly around regulatory
issues. Besides, there are claims that the new preferential agreements signed by the EC or
the US go even further in the coverage of regulatory issues, by including provisions in
areas that are not currently covered by the WTO agreements at all, such as investment
protection, competition policy, labour standards and protection of the environment.

This claim has potential systemic implications because, although they jointly account for
no more than 40 percent of world GDP (at PPP) and world trade, the EC and the US are
sometimes viewed as the ‘regulators of the world’. It is estimated indeed that, together,

1

We will generally use the term European Community (EC), which is the legally correct expression in the
WTO context. However, we will also sometime use the term European Union (EU) where appropriate.
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they account for around 80 percent of the rules that regulate the functioning of world
markets.2

The relatively broad scope of PTAs involving the EC and the US is reflected in the policy
debate, and to a lesser extent in the academic literature. Economic scholars have been
arguing for some time about the relationship between PTAs and the multilateral trading
system, with a clear division into two camps. On one hand, there are those who argue that
PTAs, especially those of the ‘new generation’, constitute a dangerous threat to the
system.3 On the other, there are those who feel that such concern is overstated, and that
there are potential solutions to reconcile the two, providing the political will exists.4

There is now also an institutional acknowledgement that PTAs should be regarded as a
serious concern for the multilateral trading system. Thus, in opening the conference
entitled ‘Multilateralising Regionalism’, held in Geneva in September 2007, WTO
Director-General Pascal Lamy reflected ‘that it would be fair to say that proliferation [of
PTAs] is breeding concern – concern about incoherence, confusion, exponential increase
of costs for business, unpredictability and even unfairness in trade relations’. Yet no
concrete action has been taken so far by the policy community to address this
multifaceted concern.

This paper serves as a building block in this discussion. We believe that, before
embarking upon a discussion as to whether (new) PTAs should be viewed with concern,
one needs to examine the facts in greater detail than is typically done in the debate. Our
primary purpose, therefore, is to analyse the precise content of the EC and US
preferential trade agreements. In order to do this, we divide the subjects covered by these
agreements into two categories: ‘WTO plus’ (WTO+), and ‘WTO extra’ (WTO-X). The
first category corresponds to those provisions of PTAs which come under the current
mandate of the WTO, where the parties undertake bilateral commitments going beyond
those they have accepted at the multilateral level. An example would be a reduction in
2

See Sapir (2007).
See, in particular, Bhagwati (2008).
4
See, for instance, Baldwin (2006).
3
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tariffs. By contrast, the WTO-X category comprises those PTA provisions that deal with
issues lying outside the current WTO mandate. An example would be a commitment on
labour standards.

At the outset it should be emphasised, however, that our aim is not to answer the question
why WTO members – and in particular the EC and the US – include WTO-X obligations
in their PTAs. At one end of the spectrum, one might suppose that PTAs serve as a kind
of preparation for setting tomorrow’s multilateral agenda. According to this argument,
assuming consistency in the subject-matter across PTAs, it will be easier to interconnect
them and multilateralise them in the future, or at least use their subject-matter as a basis
for negotiating tomorrow’s WTO rules.5 But one could also argue that the very existence
of WTO-X provisions is evidence that the preferential partners do not wish to include
certain items in the WTO, and that is why they consistently maintain them in their PTAs.

The study covers all the 14 EC and 14 US agreements with WTO partners signed by the
parties and, generally, notified to the WTO as of October 2008. In order to fully map
these agreements, we proceed in two steps.

The first step consists of listing all the policy areas contained in the 28 agreements. For
each of the 52 areas identified, we then record whether each agreement specifies
obligations.

As a second step, we determine whether each obligation contained in the agreements is
legally enforceable. We describe more precisely below why we believe that this is an
important feature and how we evaluate whether a provision is enforceable or not. Let us
simply say for the moment that the general idea is that texts that specify clear legal
obligations are more likely to be implemented than highly less hard-edged ones.

In order to shed light on the validity of the claim that the EC and US agreements go
substantially beyond the WTO agreements, we divide the (52) identified policy areas into
5

This view can be found, for instance, in Baldwin (2006).
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two groups as already indicated. The first, labelled WTO+, contains 14 areas, whereas the
second, labelled WTO-X contains 38 areas.

Applying the WTO+/ WTO-X distinction to the EC and the US sets of agreements, our
main findings are as follows.

First, we observe that while both sets cover both WTO+ and WTO-X types of provisions,
the 14 EC agreements contain almost four times as many instances of WTO-X provisions
as the 14 US agreements do. This would suggest that EC PTAs extend much more
frequently beyond the WTO agreements than US PTAs.

However, second, the picture changes dramatically once the nature of the obligations is
taken into account. The EC agreements evidence a very significant amount of ‘legal
inflation’, in particular in the parts dealing with development policy. US agreements
actually prove to contain more legally enforceable WTO-X provisions than the EC
agreements. Hence the latter contain many obligations that have no legal standing.

Third, we also find that both the EC and the US PTAs contain a significant number of
legally enforceable, substantive undertakings in WTO+ areas. Fewer obligations
contained in EC agreements tend to be enforceable than those of US agreements, but the
difference is not as pronounced as for the WTO-X areas.

Finally, we find that there is a difference in the nature of the legally enforceable
obligations contained in EC and US agreements, with the latter putting more emphasis on
regulatory areas.

The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with methodological
issues related to the agreements being studied, the classification of policies into either
WTO+ or WTO-X areas, and the definition of ‘legally enforceable’ obligations. Section 3
presents our initial findings concerning the coverage, the legal enforceability, and the
‘depth’ of obligations for WTO+ areas. Section 4 contains similar findings for WTO-X
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areas. These two sections prepare the ground for Section 5, which contains our main
analyses. Section 6 briefly summarises the results.

2. Methodological issues

The purpose of this section is to describe the set of PTAs under study, to set out how we
classify the coverage of these agreements, and how we evaluate whether a covered policy
contains legally enforceable obligations.

2.1 PTAs and the WTO

According to WTO rules, members may enter into PTAs with other WTO members either
concerning trade in goods, or trade in services, or both. With respect to trade in goods,
WTO members that satisfy the requirements included in Article XXIV GATT can legally
treat products originating in some WTO Members (those with which they have formed a
PTA) more favourably than like products originating in the other WTO member
countries. Article XXIV GATT distinguishes between two forms of PTA: free trade areas
(FTAs) and customs unions (CUs). For an FTA to be GATT-consistent, its members must
liberalise trade between them; for a CU to be GATT-consistent, its members must,
beyond liberalising trade between them, agree on a common trade policy vis-à-vis the rest
of the WTO membership. All the PTAs that will be considered here are FTAs, with the
exception of the EC-Turkey agreement, which is a CU.

In the WTO, it is also possible to form PTAs under a separate legal instrument – the
‘Enabling Clause’. But since this possibility is only available where all members of the
PTA are developing countries, such agreements are not relevant to this study.

The specific conditions for satisfying consistency with the multilateral rules concerning
goods trade are laid down in Article XXIV.5-8 GATT. Apart from requesting the PTA to
encompass substantially all trade between its members, and not to raise the overall level
of protection vis-à-vis the rest of the WTO membership, these provisions oblige WTO
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members wishing to enter into a PTA to show that they have complied with the relevant
multilateral rules.

With respect to trade in services, Article V GATS mentions only one form of preferential
scheme, entitled economic integration. It is akin to a GATT FTA since its members are
entitled to retain their own trade policies vis-à-vis third countries, although there are also
some differences between the two schemes. The disciplines of economic integration echo
those preferential schemes which apply to trade in goods: Article V.1 GATS requires that
a PTA has substantial sectoral coverage, and Article V.4 GATS requires PTA members
not to raise the overall level of barriers against non-participants.

2.2 The agreements under study

Table 1 lists the set of agreements that are scrutinised in this study, which consists of all
PTAs signed between the EC and the US, respectively, and other WTO members as of
October 2008. The list includes agreements signed before and after the creation of the
WTO, but excludes those where the partner is not a WTO member. It also includes
agreements signed by the parties but not yet ratified, and therefore not yet notified to the
WTO or actually in force. Of the 28 listed agreements 14 are EC PTAs and 14 are US
PTAs, counting the EC agreements with individual EFTA partners (Liechtenstein and
Switzerland counting as one owing to their economic union) and the European Economic
Area agreement (between the EC and the EFTA countries, except Switzerland) as one
PTA.

2.2 The coverage of the agreements

A basic aim of this study is to identify, more precisely than has been done in the literature
so far, the legal obligations imposed by PTAs involving the EU and the US, and to
compare the nature of these two sets of agreements. To this end, we have gone through
the 28 agreements in their entirety, and characterised the obligations which they impose.
The contents of these agreements have been divided into 52 policy ‘areas’. This
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characterisation is intended to be exhaustive, in the sense that all the provisions contained
in the 28 agreements fall under one or other of the areas, except for those that concern the
administration of the agreement, which we disregard. The classification is largely based
on the article headings in the case of the EC agreements, and on the chapter headings in
the case of the US agreements.

In order to shed light on our central issue – whether the EC and US agreements provide
for ‘more of the same’ relative to the WTO agreements, or impose obligations in areas
other than those already covered in the WTO agreements – we classify the 52 policy
areas into two broad groups: ‘WTO-plus’ (WTO+) and ‘WTO-extra’ (WTO-X). The
former is meant to include obligations relating to policy areas that are already subject to
some form of commitment in the WTO agreements. The PTA can here either reconfirm
existing commitments, or provide for further obligations. The archetypal obligation here
would be the formation of a FTA, since this would be a reduction in tariffs going beyond
what is already committed to in the WTO context. Examples of other areas we have
classified as WTO+ include obligations concerning SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary)
measures, TBT (technical barriers to trade) measures, antidumping, state aid, and
obligations covered by the GATS. We have also included those intellectual property
rights provisions which address issues falling under the TRIPs agreement. Finally, we
have also included export taxes, although the WTO contains no precise commitment in
this area. Nonetheless, WTO members could negotiate commitments on export taxes
under Article II GATT, so it can be argued that a WTO instrument already exists in this
area.

A WTO-X designation is, on the other hand, meant to capture an obligation in an area
that is ‘qualitatively new’, relating to a policy instrument that has not previously been
regulated by the WTO. For instance, there are no undertakings with regard to
environmental protection in the WTO. We thus classify an environmental obligation as
WTO-X. Other such clear examples are obligations concerning labour laws or movement
of capital.

8

2.3 The legal enforceability of identified areas

In order to determine the impact of the EC and US preferential trade agreements, it is
important not only to identify the areas in which the agreements contain provisions, but
also to determine the extent to which these provisions are legally enforceable. Unclearly
specified undertakings, and undertakings that parties are only weakly committed to
undertake, and that can be seemingly fulfilled with some token measure, are not likely to
be successfully invoked by a complainant in a dispute settlement proceeding, and would
presumably therefore also have little impact. In order to shed light on the extent to which
this is an issue in practice, we have evaluated each provision in each agreement for the
extent to which it specifies at least some obligation that is clearly defined, and that is
likely effectively to bind the parties.

With a view to maintaining some degree of objectivity, we have classified certain terms
as either implying enforceable or non-enforceable obligations. The following are some
examples of terms that we interpret as creating legally enforceable obligations:
•

“The parties shall allow the free movement of capital ...”

•

“Neither party may expropriate or nationalise a covered investment ...”

•

“If a party does not accept the technical regulation that is equivalent of its own it
shall, at the request of the other party, explain the reasons ...”

•

“By the end of (exact date) a party shall accede to the following international
conventions: ...”

•

“Neither party may impose performance requirements or enforce any commitment
or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation or sale...”

•

“Each party shall not fail effectively to enforce labour (environmental) laws ...”

As can be seen, the word “shall” appears in many of these examples.

9

The following examples illustrate formulations that we define to be in the opposite
category, not meeting the test of effectively binding the parties:
•

“The parties shall cooperate ...”. It is likely to be very difficult to prove that a
party has not ‘cooperated’.

•

“Dialogue shall be established ...”. It would require almost complete silence from
the respondent for the complainant successfully to argue that no dialogue has been
established.

•

“Special attention shall be paid to ...”. How could it be verified that special
attention has not been devoted to an issue?

•

“Measures necessary for development and promotion of ...”. It is likely to be very
hard for a complainant in a dispute to prove either that that a measure is necessary
or that it is not necessary for development.

•

“Parties may conclude ...”. This phrase does not impose any restriction on the
parties.

•

“Parties shall strive (aim) to ...”. It would be difficult to prove absence of best
endeavours.

Distinguishing the degree of legal enforceability in this way cannot only be defended
from the point of view of practical experience, but also from the point of view of the
principles of international law. One of the requirements in Article 2 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties for an agreement to be a treaty is that it is “governed
by international law”. This is normally interpreted to require the parties to intend that the
agreement has legal effect under international law. The terminology of an agreement may
indicate the extent to which such intent exists.

10

3. WTO+ areas

This section discusses the extent to which the various WTO+ areas we have identified are
covered in the 28 EC and US agreements, whether existing obligations are legally
binding, and the extent to which they entail substantive undertakings.6

3.1 Coverage of WTO+ areas

The coverage of WTO+ areas in the EC and US agreements is displayed under the
heading ‘AC’ (for Area Covered) in, respectively, Tables 2 and 3, where a dark box
indicates that a particular agreement contains an obligation in a particular area.

As can be seen, there is generally speaking a very high degree of coverage in both EC
and US agreements. There are three areas for which all EC and all US agreements contain
obligations: Industrial Products, Agricultural Products, and TRIPs. All the EC agreements
also include obligations concerning Customs Administration, TBT, Antidumping and
Countervailing Measures. Most (but not all) of the US agreements also cover these areas.
All the US agreements include obligations concerning Public Procurement and Export
Taxes, and so do all but one or two of the EC agreements. Also, most EC and US
agreements include provisions concerning State Trading Enterprises and State Aid. There
is thus a fairly high degree of similarity between the two sets of agreements when it
comes to the coverage of WTO+ areas. Both contain obligations in more or less the same
areas.

There are, however, a few important differences between the two sets of agreements in
terms of coverage. First, GATS obligations are included in all US agreements, but only in

6

Section 4 will undertake a parallel analysis of WTO-X areas. While we will discuss some findings in the
respective sections, we will save the broader discussion to Section 5.
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four EC ones. Second, most US agreements include TRIMs obligations, while none of the
EC ones has anything explicit on this.7

3.2 The enforceability of WTO+ obligations

So far we have discussed the areas that appear in the two sets of agreements. We next
seek to identify those obligations that are legally enforceable. The ‘LE’ in tables 2 and 3
shows the areas where undertakings are legally enforceable.

A dark box indicates that the language is sufficiently precise or committing to provide a
legally enforceable obligation. A cross-hatched box indicates that the language is
sufficiently precise or committing, but that it is non-enforceable due to an explicit
statement that dispute settlement is not available.

Let us start by pointing to the areas that are exempt from dispute settlement. As can be
seen, the EC agreement with Mexico has four such exemptions, for SPS, Antidumping,
Countervailing Measures, and TRIPs; the EC agreement with CARIFORUM has
exemptions for the latter two areas, and the EC-Chile agreement has exemptions for State
Trading Enterprises and State Aid. The US agreements contain exemptions from dispute
settlement only in the context of SPS, but do so for 10 agreements, allowing dispute
settlement regarding SPS measures only in the agreement with Israel and in NAFTA.
In areas that are non-enforceable due to imprecise language, we note that, with respect to
the EC agreements, in 7 of the 14 agreements Public Procurement undertakings are not
enforceable; in 9 out of the 14 agreements TBT undertakings are not enforceable; and in
10 out of 12 agreements SPS undertakings are not enforceable. The US agreements, on
the other hand, contain relatively speaking substantially fewer areas where legally non-

7

Note, however, that by reaffirming the Art. III and XI GATT rights and obligations in its PTAs, the EC
effectively introduces obligations with respect to the two forms of TRIMs currently sanctioned by the
multilateral system, that is, export performance-, and local content-type of investment measures.
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enforceable language has been included, both in absolute numbers and relative to the
number of covered areas.
Turning to the areas with enforceable obligations, we observe that both sets of
agreements include such obligations for all their agreements with regard to tariff
liberalisation (FTAs) for both industrial and agricultural products, and with respect to 12
out of the 14 agreements in the areas of Customs Administration, Export Taxes,
Antidumping, Countervailing Measures, State Aid, and TRIPs.

3.3 Main observations concerning WTO+ undertakings

Our initial conclusions concerning the WTO+ parts of the agreements are the following:

1. Both the EC and US sets of agreements have a large number of legally
enforceable obligations with significant undertakings in areas covered by the
current WTO mandate, such as tariff cuts in goods, Customs Administration,
Export Taxes, Antidumping, Countervailing Measures, Agriculture, and TRIPs.
2. Commitments in the ‘new WTO areas’ (GATS, TRIPs) figure prominently in both
sets of agreements, although more so in US PTAs as far as services are concerned.
3. The extent of the overlap between the two sets of agreements notwithstanding, we
still observe some notable differences: the US agreements have substantial,
legally enforceable obligations concerning TRIMS, TBT, and GATS, while the
EC agreements contain significantly more obligations of this kind concerning
State Trading Enterprises.
4. Both sets of agreements opt for staged tariff liberalisation with respect to both
industrial and farm goods. Still, it is very difficult to pronounce on their
consistency with the WTO rules in light of the confusion surrounding the meaning
of the terms appearing in Article XXIV GATT, and the lack of practice regarding
the interpretation of Article V GATS.8

8

See Mavroidis (2007).
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4. WTO-X areas

We now turn our attention to the WTO-X areas, which refer to provisions regarding
commitments in policy areas not covered by the current mandate of the WTO.

4.1 The coverage of WTO-X areas

Tables 4 and 5 provide information about the coverage of the two sets of agreements for
WTO-X areas.

We will start by describing the overlap between the two sets of agreements, and then
revert to the differences among them. We should note at the outset however that, for the
most part, the two sets of agreements differ significantly in their WTO-X subject-matter.
Four areas – Environment, Intellectual Property, Investment, and Movement of Capital appear in both sets of agreements; 12 of the 14 EC agreements include commitments in
these areas, and so do 11 of the 14 US agreements. There is also some overlap with
regard to Competition: all EC agreements include such a commitment, while 7 of the US
agreements also do.

US agreements typically also include commitments in two additional areas: Labour
Market Regulation, an item that has been included in 13 US agreements, and AntiCorruption, where the corresponding number is 10. Besides these areas, US agreements
contain commitments in two additional WTO-X areas – Data Protection, which has been
included in two agreements, and Energy, which has been included in one.

All of the 38 WTO-X areas – except Anti-Corruption – are covered in at least one of the
14 EC agreements. Of the 14 agreements, ten include provisions concerning Agriculture,9
Cultural Cooperation, Education and Training, Energy, Financial Assistance, Human
Rights, Illicit Drugs, Industrial Cooperation, Money Laundering, Political Dialogue,
Regional Cooperation, Research and Technology, Social Matters, and Statistics. The only
9

We refer to commitments which lie outside the current WTO mandate.
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agreement that stands out in terms of coverage is the one with Turkey, which contains
commitments in only two areas: Competition and Intellectual Property Rights.

4.2 The enforceability of WTO-X obligations

While the EC agreements contain a larger number of WTO-X areas, it is the US
agreements that contain the (proportionately speaking) higher number of legally
enforceable obligations in these areas.

The US agreements contain few areas with non-enforceable provisions:

1. The main source of non-enforceability is the exemption of Competition-related
disciplines from dispute settlement (illustrated by a cross-hatched box under the
heading LE in Table 4.2); all seven agreements that include a Competition
provision explicitly exclude the commitments from dispute settlement.
2. There are four further instances of non-enforceability: two regarding AntiCorruption and two concerning Consumer Protection. In total, only 13 percent (11
out of 82) of the covered provisions are deemed to be non-enforceable.

By contrast, nearly 75% (230 out of 310) of the provisions included in the EC agreements
are non-enforceable. The EC agreements contain enforceable obligations in only five
WTO-X areas in a significant number of agreements:

1. Competition (in 13 out of the 14 agreements that contain commitments in this
area);
2. IPR (11 out of 14);
3. Movement of Capital (13 out of 13);
4. Investment (8 out of 12); and
5. Social Matters (7 out of 13).
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For each of the remaining 33 areas, there are no legally enforceable obligations in more
than 3 agreements signed by the EC. Most obligations are not enforceable at all. One
agreement represents an outlier, the EEA, an agreement that involves the EC and some of
its western European trading partners with whom there is a long tradition of multi-level
cooperation.

4.3 Main observations concerning WTO-X undertakings

Our initial conclusions concerning the WTO-X parts of the agreements are as follows:

1. Whereas the US agreements typically contain few areas where enforceable
obligations have been agreed, the EC agreements contain a smaller (proportional
to the overall) number of areas with enforceable obligations, and a much larger
number of areas where exhortatory language has been agreed. It thus seems that,
whereas the US has adopted a rather ‘functionalist’ approach (ensuring legal
enforceability of the selected areas), the EC has opted for ‘legal inflation’,
whereby a large number of areas are included in the agreement, but very few of
them are coupled with legally enforceable obligations.

2. Altogether, only 8 of the 38 WTO-X areas involve legally enforceable obligations
in a significant number of agreements.

3. Three of these 8 areas concern both EC and US agreements: Intellectual Property
Rights, Investment, and Movement of Capital.

4. Three areas concern mostly or solely US agreements: Anti-Corruption,
Environment and Labour.

5. Two areas involve EC agreements only: Competition, and Social Matters.
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6. Finally, provisions concerning Terrorism, Illegal Immigration, Visa and
Migration, and Illicit Drugs appear in some of the EC agreements (in respectively
5, 6, 3 and 10 agreements), but typically the obligations are not enforceable.
Contrary to what may have been expected, these national security-related areas
are not present in US agreements.

5. PTAs and the WTO – more of the same, or ventures into new areas?

A central issue in the policy debate concerning PTAs has been whether they support or
hinder multilateral trade liberalisation. This issue has received a new twist during the last
decade, because of the common claim that these agreements are no longer about deeper
integration in areas where the multilateral system already provides a degree of integration
but are instead mainly to be seen as ventures into new policy areas. Having so far
analysed the WTO+ and the WTO-X areas separately, we will in this section discuss the
balance in the EC and US PTAs between the WTO+ and the WTO-X areas. Our purpose
is to distil an overall picture of where the centre of gravity of these agreements lies. Are
they essentially about further integration along the same lines as in the GATT/WTO, or
are they mainly about providing integration in new policy areas? As before, we will put
particular emphasis on the extent to which identified obligations are likely to be legally
enforceable, and we will seek to characterise the areas where legal inflation is most
pervasive, and also whether it is likely to be an intentional feature of certain areas.

5.1 Differences in coverage of EC and US PTAs

In order to detect the centre of gravity of the EC and US agreements in terms of coverage,
Figure 1 plots the number of covered WTO+ areas (measured on the vertical axis) against
the number of covered WTO-X areas (measured on the horizontal axis) for each of the 28
agreements. As can be seen, a very pronounced pattern emerges: all the EC agreements
(with one exception) are positioned to the south-east of the US agreements. That is, in
terms of coverage, the EC agreements have more WTO-X and fewer WTO+ areas than
the US agreements. Hence, while both the EC and the US agreements cover a large
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proportion of WTO+ areas (between 10 and 12 for the EC and between 12 to 14 for the
US, out of a maximum of 14), the EC PTAs cover a much greater proportion of WTO-X
areas (reaching around 30 in recent agreements, out of a maximum of 38) than US
agreements (with less than ten areas covered, even in the most recent agreements).

5.2 Centre of gravity of EC and US PTAs adjusted for legal enforceability

If one discards non-enforceable obligations, the previous picture changes dramatically.
As shown in Figure 2, while the number of WTO+ areas remains slightly larger for US
agreements (ranging between 11 and 13) compared to EC agreements (ranging between 8
and 10), the number of WTO-X areas with legally enforceable provisions is now slightly
higher for US (ranging between 5 and 6) compared to EC (ranging mostly between 3 and
5) agreements.10 The EC agreements thus evidence a very considerable degree of ‘legal
inflation’ in WTO-X areas, a phenomenon which is much less prevalent in the EC
agreements for WTO+ areas or in the WTO+ and WTO-X areas of the US PTAs.

It should be noted that the two latest EC agreements, with Albania and the
CARIFORUM, contain slightly more legally enforceable WTO-X provisions than do the
US agreements. In this respect, the EC-CARIFORUM agreement resembles more the US
PTAs than any other EC PTA: it covers relatively few WTO-X areas, of which many
contain legally enforceable provisions.11 Still, only half of the 14 WTO-X areas that are
covered contain enforceable obligations. And the EC-Albania agreement, while having
eight areas with enforceable obligations, features the same degree of legal inflation - 23
out of the 31 areas in the EC-Albania agreement are classified as non-enforceable - as the
other EC agreements.

10

One agreement stands out in each set: the EEA agreeement on the EC side, with 23 legally binding
provisions, and the US-Israel agreement, with zero.
11
The EC-Albania PTA is a more traditional EC agreement in this respect: it covers 31 WTO-X areas, of
which only 8 contain legally binding provisions.
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5.3 In which areas is legal inflation most pervasive?

Table 6 reorganises somewhat the data on coverage and legally enforceability in order to
highlight the type of areas where legal inflation is most pervasive. The table divides all
areas (i.e. both WTO+ and WTO-X areas) into five broad groups, along different lines
than the WTO+/WTO-X distinction, which was designed to capture the nature of each
area relative to the WTO agreements. Here the intention is instead to capture the content
of each area in terms of policy objectives or instruments. Group 1, Trade- and
Investment-related Obligations, is meant to capture obligations that address policy
instruments affecting goods trade and investment, and which are applied at the border.
Group 2, GATS/TRIPs/IPR, and Group 3, Migration-related Regulations, are selfexplanatory. Group 4, Domestic Trade-related Regulations, is intended to include
obligations concerning domestic (behind-the-border) regulations. Finally, Group 5,
labelled ‘Other’, includes all remaining areas and mainly contains development-related
provisions from EC agreements. Although this grouping of areas is heuristic, we believe
that it is informative in that it reflects sharp differences in legal inflation across groups as
the discussion below indicates.

Table 6 gives, group by group, the number of times each area within the group occurs in
EU or US agreements; it then gives, group by group, the number of instances each area
within that group occurs with enforceable obligations. In addition, it calculates an Index
of Legal Inflation, which is defined as the number of instances of legally non-enforceable
obligations in a group of areas relative to the total number of times that group of areas
occurs.

There are two main findings that emerge from the table. First, and once again, there is a
striking difference between the EC and the US agreements. Taking all areas together, the
inflation rate is 55 percent for the EC PTAs compared to only 10 percent for the US
agreements. Second, there are significant differences across areas. Distinguishing
between the Trade and Regulations areas (i.e. groups 1-4) on the one hand and ‘Other’
areas on the other hand, one observes a second striking difference. For the EC the
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inflation rate is only 26 percent in the former grouping as opposed to 92 percent in the
latter. Moreover, the difference in inflation rates between the EC and the US is much less
for Trade and Regulations (26 versus 10 percent) than it is for the total of all areas.

One may wonder whether the difference of legal inflation between EC and US
agreements is not simply the reflection of a unique feature of some EC agreements, which
is that they are not simply trade agreements, but instead constitute a first step towards EU
membership. In other to check for this possibility, we have computed the legal inflation
rates for the nine EC agreements with non-European countries,12 which can be regarded
as trade agreements comparable to those between the US and its partners. Taking all areas
together, the inflation rate for these nine EC agreements is 61 percent, which is six
percentage points more than the inflation rate for all the 14 EC agreements. Moreover,
the inflation rate for the EC RTAs with non-European partners is larger than the inflation
rate for the EC RTAs with all partners for every single of the five broad groups shown in
Table 6. One can, therefore, safely conclude that the difference of legal inflation between
EC and US RTAs is not caused by the presence of agreements with potential future EU
members amongst the EC RTAs.

We now detail these differences across the five groups. As can be seen from Table 6,
there are clearly systematic differences in the extent of legal inflation in the different
groups. At one end we have the Trade and Investment group, which displays literally zero
legal inflation for the US agreements, and only nine percent for the EC agreements, with
most of the latter explained by obligations in the WTO-X Investment area. Furthermore,
not only is there little or no inflation, these areas are also covered in almost all
agreements of both the EC and the US (with the exception of Export Taxes, and TRIMs
in EC agreements), and they very often involve substantial undertakings. The
GATS/TRIPs/IPR group displays a very similar pattern.

At the other end of the spectrum in terms of legal inflation is the ‘Other’ group, which
largely consists of development-related undertakings appearing in the cooperation parts
12

Five of the 14 EC PTAs are with European partners: EEA, Turkey, FYRoM, Croatia, and Albania.
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of the EC agreements. The US agreements effectively have no instances of this group of
areas, and are therefore irrelevant here. For this group, which contains a large number of
areas which are covered in a large number of EC agreements, the legal inflation rate is
92%! This average is higher than the inflation rate for any of the other groups, and is
even higher than each individual area in all other groups, with the exception of two areas:
the Visa, Border Control and Asylum area, and the Human Rights area. Based on this
observation, we would argue that, to the extent that these agreements promote
development, it is not because of the enforceability of their legal commitments.

Provisions related to domestic regulations, in the broad sense of the term, can be found in
both WTO+ and WTO-X areas. In the group Domestic Trade-related Regulations we
have tried to distinguish regulations which have more obvious potential to be used as
legal arguments in a trade dispute from those that do not seem to have such potential. It is
for this reason that, for instance, Labour and Environment areas are grouped together
with the SPS and TBT areas, while areas such as Nuclear Safety and Money Laundering which can also be said to address domestic regulation - are kept under the ‘Other’ label. It
is also for this reason that the Environment and Labour areas are classified as potentially
affecting trade.

Turning to the numbers, we see that this group reveals a more complicated pattern than
the other groups. However, there is a significant difference in legal inflation in the group
for the EC and the US agreements, with 42 percent of the areas covered in EC agreements
being non-enforceable, compared to only 24 percent for the US.

An issue of particular interest with regard to EC and US PTAs is the extent to which they
can be seen as a means of transferring the regulatory regimes of the EC and the US to
other countries. The scattered pattern that emerges for this group makes it difficult to
draw unambiguous conclusions in this regard, and may also indicate that the groups need
to be redefined to answer this question properly. But it is noteworthy that in almost all the
areas in this group, the PTAs extend either international or EU/US domestic regulatory
standards to partner countries. Since the EU and the US already broadly meet the
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international or domestic regulatory standards contained in the PTAs, these agreements
could indeed potentially be vehicles for transferring regulatory rules of the EC and the
US to their PTA partners. One might imagine various ways in which such a transfer
occurs. For instance, the formation of the PTAs may affect domestic policy discussions
concerning the choice of regulatory regime. However, for these agreements to effect such
a transfer by legally binding the partner countries to a hub’s regulatory regime, they must
contain enforceable provisions. As we have seen, the picture seems to be mixed in this
regard.

5.5 Closing remarks

The general picture that emerges from comparing the undertakings in the WTO+ and
WTO-X areas for the two sets of PTAs is the following:

1. The EC agreements go much further than the US agreements in covering areas
outside the scope of the WTO agreements. There has also been an increasing
tendency to this effect.

2. When adjusting for non-enforceable language, one observes significant ‘legal
inflation’ in non-WTO parts of the EC agreements. In fact, the EC agreements are
similar to the US agreements in that much of the emphasis of enforceable
language is on existing WTO areas.

3. Both EC and US PTAs contain non-WTO areas with substantial undertakings. An
important aspect of both sets of agreements is thus that they combine substantial
undertakings in WTO areas and in non-WTO areas.

4. A significant proportion of the substantial, legally enforceable obligations is in
areas where domestic or international regulations are important, but the specific
regulatory areas differ for the two hubs.

22

6 Conclusion

There is growing concern about preferential trading agreements and the role they should
play in the multilateral trading system. Not only are they becoming increasingly
prevalent, there is also a perception that many recent PTAs, especially those centred on
the EC and the US, go far beyond the scope of the current WTO agreements.

With a view to shedding light on whether the above perception corresponds to reality, this
study has assessed in some detail all the PTAs signed by the EC or the US and other
WTO members by dividing all the areas they include into two categories: WTO+
obligations, which are areas already covered by the present WTO agreements, and WTOX obligations, which are areas currently falling outside these agreements.

Our examination of the two sets of PTAs yields two main findings.

First, both EC and US agreements contain a significant number of WTO+ and WTO-X
obligations. However, EC agreements go much further in terms of WTO-X coverage than
US agreements. When discounting for ‘legal inflation’ the picture remains largely the
same for US agreements, but it changes dramatically for EC agreements. Adjusting for
‘legal inflation’, US agreements actually contain more legally binding provisions, both in
WTO+ and WTO-X areas, than EC agreements.

It is thus clear that the EU and the US have chosen markedly different strategies for
including provisions in their PTAs that go beyond the WTO agreements. In particular, EC
agreements display a fair deal of ‘legal inflation’, a phenomenon almost totally absent in
US agreements. The study does not permit us to draw precise conclusions about this
asymmetry of behaviour between the EU and the US, but the fact that much of the ‘legal
inflation’ occurs in development-related provisions, which are unique to the EC
agreements, suggests that the EU has a greater need than the US to portray its PTAs as
not driven solely by commercial interests. Our feeling is that this may reflect a lack of
consensus on the part of EU member states about the ultimate purpose of these PTAs, the
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wide variety of provisions of weak legal value representing a compromise between
various interests among EU members.

Second, although EC and US preferential trade agreements do go significantly beyond the
WTO agreements, the number of legally enforceable WTO-X provisions contained in EC
and US PTAs is still in fact quite small. Provisions that can be regarded as really breaking
new ground compared to existing WTO agreements are few and far between:
environment and labour standards for US agreements, and competition policy for EC
agreements. These provisions clearly all deal with regulatory issues. The other
enforceable WTO-X provisions found in EC and US PTAs concern domains that more or
less relate to existing WTO agreements, such as investment, capital movement and
intellectual property, which also concern regulatory matters.

The fact that the new, legally enforceable WTO-X provisions all deal with regulatory
issues suggests that EC and US agreements effectively serve as a means for the two hubs
to export their own regulatory approaches to their PTA partners. The study does not
permit us to draw conclusions about the respective costs and benefits of this situation for
the hubs and the spokes, but our feeling is that it serves primarily the interests of the two
‘regulators of the world’. This feeling is based on the fact that the legally enforceable
WTO-X provisions included in EC and US agreements have all been the subject of
earlier, but failed, attempts by the EU and/or the US to incorporate them in WTO rules,
against the wishes of developing countries. To the extent that our conclusion is correct, it
supports the view expressed inter alia by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy that PTAs
might be breeding concern about unfairness in trade relations.

What the implications of our findings are for the ‘regionalism-versus-multilateralism’
issue is beyond the scope of this paper. But what is clear is that a serious discussion of
this matter needs to start from a detailed assessment of the nature of EC and US PTAs,
including the findings reported in this study.
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Table 1: EC and US PTAs with other WTO members, signed as of October 2008*

EC Agreements
Norway
Iceland
Switzerland
EEA†
Turkey
Tunisia
Israel
Morocco
Jordan
South Africa
Mexico
FYRoM
Egypt
Croatia
Chile
Albania
CARIFORUM

Date of signature by
parties
11/11/1970
22/07/1972
22/07/1972
02/05/1992
06/03/1995
17/07/1995
20/11/1995
26/02/1996
11/24/1997
11/10/1999
23/03/2000
09/04/2001
25/06/2001
29/10/2001
18/10/2002
12/06/2006
15/10/2008

US Agreements

Israel
NAFTA
Jordan
Singapore
Chile
Australia
Morocco
CAFTA-DR
Bahrain
Peru
Oman
Colombia
Panama
South Korea

Date of signature by
parties

22/04/1985
17/12/1992
24/10/2000
06/05/2003
06/06/2003
18/05/2004
15/06/2004
05/08/2004
14/09/2004
12/04/2006
19/01/2006
22/11/2006
28/06/2007
30/06/2007

Source: World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Commission (DG External Relations) and Office of
the United States Trade Representative. Notes: * The EC also has reciprocal PTAs with several non-WTO
members: Algeria, Andorra, Faroe Islands, Lebanon, Overseas Countries and Territories (OTCs), the
Palestinian Authority, San Marino, and Syria. † The EEA was signed between the European Community
and the EFTA countries, except Switzerland. Some EFTA countries later joined the European Community
(now Union). The remaining EFTA countries which belong to the EEA are Iceland, Lichtenstein and
Norway. Switzerland has signed separate bilateral agreements with the European Community that also
cover both trade in goods and in services. When we refer to the EEA, we will use the term loosely to cover
all agreements that have been concluded between EFTA countries, including Switzerland, and the EC.
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EEA

EC-Turkey

EC-Tu nisia

EC-Israel

EC-Morocco

EC-Jordan

EC-South Africa

EC-Mexico

EC-FYRo M

EC-Egypt

EC-Croatia

EC-Chile

EC-Alban ia

EC-CARIFORUM

Table 2: Classification of WTO+ areas in EC agreements

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

Total:
AC

LE

FTA Ind

14

14

FTA Agr

14

14

Customs Admin istration

14

13

Export Taxes

12

12

SPS

8

3

TBT

14

5

STE

13

12

AD

14

12

CVM

14

12

State Aid

13

12

Public Procurement

14

7

TRIMs

0

0

GATS

4

4

TRIPs

14

13

WTO+ Total:

13 13

11 10

10

8

12

9

10

8

12

9

10

8

12

7

12 10

11

9

12 10

13

11

11 10

13 11

162 133

US-Israel

NAFTA

US-Jordan

US-Sin gapo re

US-Ch ile

US - Australia

US - Morocco

US-CAFTA-DR

US - Bahrain

US-Peru

US-Oman

US - Colombia

US-Panama

US- Republic of Korea

Table 3: Classification of WTO+ areas in US agreements

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

Total:
AC

LE

FTA Ind

14

14

FTA Agr

14

14

Cu stoms Administration

13

13

Export Taxes

13

13

SPS

12

2

TBT

12

11

STE

9

7

AD

12

12

CVM

12

12

State Aid

11

11

Public Procurement

14

13

TRIMs

12

12

GATS

13

13

TRIPs

14

14

175

161

WTO+ Total:

8

8

14 14

6

5

12 11

14 13

14 13

14 12

13 12

12 11

14 13

13 12

14 13

14 12

13 12

Source: Authors. Note: The GATS area covers commitments related to services liberalisation. AC: Area
covered; LE: Legally enforceable.

28

EEA

EC-Turkey

EC-Tunisia

EC-Israel

EC-Morocco

EC-Jordan

EC-South Africa

EC-Mexico

EC-FYRoM

EC-Egypt

EC-Croatia

EC-Chile

EC-Albania

EC-CARIFORUM

Table 4: WTO-X areas covered in EC Agreements

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

AA LE

Total:
AA

LE

Anti-Corruption

0

0

Competition Policy

14

13

Environmental Laws

13

2

IPR

14

11

Investment

12

8

Labor Market Regulations

2

2

Movement of Capital

13

13

Consumer Protection

7

1

Data Protection

6

3

Agriculture

11

0

Approximation of Legislation

9

2

Audio Visual

9

1

Civil Protection

1

1

Innovation Policies

1

0

Cultural Cooperation

12

1

Economic Policy Dialogue

6

1

Education and Training

10

1

Energy

13

1

Fiancial Assistance

11

3

Health

3

1

Human Rights

12

0

Illegal Immigration

6

3
0

Illicit Drugs

10

Industrial Cooperation

11

0

Information Society

7

0
0

Mining

3

Money Laundering

10

0

Nuclear Safety

2

0

Political Dialog

11

0

Public Administration

5

1
0

Regional Cooperation

11

Research and Technology

12

1

SME

7

1

Social Matters

13

7

Statistics

11

1

Taxation

3

0

Terrorism

5

1

Visa and Asylum

4

0

310

80

WTO-X Total:

23 23

2

2

20

4

19

4

20

4

20

5

24

29

3

26

3

30

6

24

3

29

5

29

3

31

8

14

7

US-Israel

NAFTA

US-Jordan

US-Singapore

US-Chile

US - Australia

US - Morocco

US-CAFTA-DR

US - Bahrain

US-Peru

US-Oman

US - Colombia

US-Panama

US- Republic of Korea

Table 5: WTO-X areas covered in US Agreements

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

AC LE

Total:
AC

LE

Anti-Corruption

10

Competition Policy

7

0

Environmental Laws

13

13

8

IPR

13

13

Investment

11

11

Labor Market Regulations

13

13

Movement of Capital

12

12

Consumer Protection

2

0

Data Protection

0

0

Agriculture

0

0

Approximation of Legislation

0

0

Audio Visual

0

0

Civil Protection

0

0

Innovation Policies

0

0

Cultural Cooperation

0

0

Economic Policy Dialogue

0

0

Education and Training

0

0

Energy

1

1

Fiancial Assistance

0

0

Health

0

0

Human Rights

0

0

Illegal Immigration

0

0

Illicit Drugs

0

0

Industrial Cooperation

0

0

Information Society

0

0

Mining

0

0

Money Laundering

0

0

Nuclear Safety

0

0

Political Dialog

0

0

Public Administration

0

0

Regional Cooperation

0

0

Research and Technology

0

0

SME

0

0

Social Matters

0

0

Statistics

0

0

Taxation

0

0

Terrorism

0

0

Visa and Asylum

0

0

82

71

0

0

7

6

3

3

7

5

6

5

8

5

6

6

6

6

5

5

Source: Authors. Note: AC = Area covered; LE = Legally enforceable.
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7

6

6

6

7

6

6

6

8

6

Table 6: Legal inflation by groups of areas
EU PTAs
AC
1. Trade- and Investment-related Obligations

LE

US PTAs

Legal
Inflation

AC

Legal
Inflation

LE

107

98

8%

113

113

0%

2. GATS/TRIPs/IPR

32

28

13%

40

40

0%

3. Migration-related Regulations

23

10

57%

-

-

-

104

60

42%

103

78

24%

266

196

26%

256

231

10%

206

17

92%

1

1

0%

472

213

55%

257

232

10%

4. Domestic Trade-related Regulations
Total Trade and Regulations:
5. Other
Total all areas:
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 1: The balance between WTO+ and WTO-X undertakings in terms of
coverage
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Source: Own calculations based on Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
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Figure 2: The balance between WTO+ and WTO-X undertakings, discounting for
the lack of legal enforceability
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Source: Own calculations based on Table 2.1, Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Note: LE:
Legally enforceable; AC: Areas covered.
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